On February 20, 2026, the Supreme Court held that the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) does not authorize the President to impose tariffs. The Supreme Court did not itself order refunds; the U.S. Court of International Trade (CIT) did.
With the ever-growing barrage of rhetoric over just how, when, and if, AI will kill us all, the conversation also lends itself to, do we believe it will be AI that kills us, or a bad actor using AI?
The time has come. The U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security’s (“BIS”) Affiliates Rule that was postponed last year is slated to take effect November 10, 2026, barring another extension.
CBP issued an Advance notice of proposed rulemaking, “Heightened Import Disclosures for Supply Chain Visibility,” 91 Fed Reg 56408 (FRN), on September 2, 2026. Responses are due to CBP by December 1, 2026, using the Federal eRulemaking Portal: http://www.regulations.gov. Follow the instructions for submitting comments via docket number USCBP–2026–1058.
Chinese President Xi Jinping made a reciprocal state visit to Washington last week, meeting with President Donald Trump. The White House announced the new U.S.-China Board of Trade had reached a consensus on recommendations for more favorable tariff treatment on $30 billion of non-sensitive goods in each direction.
The Securities and Exchange Commission issued a proposed rule, “Regulation Crypto Assets,” 91 Fed. Reg. 54510, on August 21, 2026 (FRN). Comments are due by October 20, 2026. Comments should reference File Number S7-2026-27 and may be submitted through the SEC.
Vào ngày 25 tháng 8 năm 2026, U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) đã phối hợp với U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) và U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) để ra mắt Lực Lượng Chống Gian Lận Thương Mại (Trade Fraud Task Force). Lực lượng này đóng vai trò quan trọng trong chính sách siết chặt việc kiểm soát hành vi trốn thuế quan, gian lận hải quan và các hình thức buôn lậu theo Tariff Act of 1930, False Claims Act (FCA), cũng như các quy định về gian lận thương mại và âm mưu phạm tội thuộc Title 18.
On August 25, 2025, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) launched the Trade Fraud Task Force (Task Force) in collaboration with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP). The cross-agency Task Force is a crucial part of the Administration’s enforcement agenda against tariff evasion, Customs fraud, and smuggling schemes under the Tariff Act of 1930, the False Claims Act (FCA), and Title 18’s trade fraud and conspiracy provisions.
On September 18, 2026, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) began enhanced enforcement of importer of record (IOR) identity data on CBP Form 5106. CBP announced the enforcement program in a general notice published in the Federal Register. Accuracy of Importer of Record Data Submitted to CBP.
Unused merchandise drawbacks allow a claimant to recover up to 99% of the duties paid on imported goods that are exported, unused, within five years of importation. For importers of apparel, footwear, eyewear, and accessories, customer returns complicate that recovery. Once a product has been sold at retail and is returned, United States Customs and Border Protection (CBP) treats it as merchandise that may have been used for its intended purpose, and its new appearance does not prove otherwise.
As IEEPA refunds make their way back to importers, businesses are confronting a question that many commercial agreements never anticipated. Contracts frequently address who bears the cost when a new tariff is imposed, whether through a tariff surcharge, price-adjustment provision, or other pass-through mechanism. Far fewer address the opposite scenario: what happens when the tariff is later invalidated and the Importer of Record (“IOR”) receives the money back?
The new DHS/DOJ Trade Fraud Resource Guide should resonate across the trade ecosystem, especially for importers, Customs brokers, and in-house counsel.
The war with Iran is being fought with missiles, aircraft and naval forces, but some of its most consequential effects are disruptions impacting energy markets, international shipping, insurance, supply chains, and prices, while adding another layer of sanctions and tariff risk to international trade. The result is particularly significant because the Strait of Hormuz, at the center of the conflict, is one of the most important arteries in world commerce.
A municipal government’s use of emergency powers might seem inconsequential, but it contributes to many communities’ accumulation of debt, housing and commercial space that is affordable to hypothetical residents but not actual ones, surveillance cameras, empty offices and strip malls, and contractual commitments to data centers and private prisons – all without any meaningful public involvement.
There are about 200 straits worldwide, but only 18–20 of them actually matter for global trade, and 9 are considered truly critical choke points. So, these are the straits/canals where closure would cause (and is currently causing) massive global economic shock: Strait of Malacca, Strait of Hormuz, Suez Canal, Panama Canal, Bab elMandeb, Strait of Gibraltar, Bosphorus Strait, Danish Straits, and of course, the ever-impending blockage of the Taiwan Strait.
A sweeping new White House Executive Order is set to once again shake up global supply chains by requiring a historic overhaul of the U.S. Importer of Record (IOR) framework. It lays out raising penalty floors, and tightening disclosure rules for everyone bringing goods into the United States, among other things.
“Origin Engineering” refers to modifying the sourcing of essential product inputs or relocating key manufacturing processes from countries subject to higher tariff rates to jurisdictions with more favorable trade treatment. It is one of the most effective tools available to importers navigating elevated tariff exposure.
Mexico’s customs and foreign trade legal framework has evolved toward a stricter and more controlled compliance model.
On June 3, 2026, President Trump issued Executive Order 14411, “Strengthening Customs Enforcement,” directing the Department of Homeland Security and U.S. Customs and Border Protection to tighten importer eligibility, increase disclosure obligations, and expand enforcement measures across the U.S. import system.
Yes, regarding this particular topic I am immediately surrounded by all of those external voices, even internal, telling me of how ridiculous it would be for the US to follow through and pull out of the USMCA. My response of course is noting that I probably wouldn’t have given the topic a second thought had the President of the United States not mentioned that this was a consideration regarding the upcoming July 2026 USMCA review.