As is well known the US has imposed duties of 25% on imports from Canada and Mexico. This means that those imports will take the regular duty plus 25%. For example, a switchgear assembly classified under 8537.10.91 made in Canada or Mexico will take a duty of 2.7% plus the special tariff of 25% for a total rate of 27.7% of the value.
On March 3, 2025, the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) released the 2025 Trade Policy Agenda and 2024 Annual Report on the Trade Agreements Program. The report outlines the rationale of the Trump Administration for its trade policy goals and actions. It complements and expands on the America First Trade Policy Executive Order and also encompasses the massive imposition of tariffs by the President on April 2 in his so-called “Liberation Day” Executive Order and Fact Sheet.
Donald Trump’s first term in office pursued an aggressive foreign policy toward China, imposing tariffs, restricting technology transfers, and accusing Beijing of unfair trade practices. However, one unintended consequence of this hardline approach has been China’s accelerated expansion into Latin America—a region traditionally within the U.S. sphere of influence.
Liberation Day passed with the promised reciprocal tariffs touted by the Trump administration. The president, surrounded by workers in the Rose Garden on April 2, executed a number of tariffs promising to Make America Wealthy Again. How did they calculate these tariffs? Well, there’s speculation.
On March 7, 2025, the White House hosted a Digital Assets Summit to celebrate the creation of a Bitcoin Strategic Reserve and a Digital Assets Stockpile by an Executive Order titled, “Establishment of the Strategic Bitcoin Reserve and United States Digital Asset Stockpile“. The Executive Order recognizes that “The Bitcoin protocol permanently caps the total supply of bitcoin (BTC) at 21 million coins, which is critical to its value proposition as a scarce asset.
The various tariffs that President Trump has imposed since retaking office are based on delegated authority found in several existing statutes. But a century ago, tariffs were primarily the purview of Congress. One of the most controversial manifestations of U.S. tariff legislation (and of American legislation in general) was the Smoot–Hawley Tariff Act of 1930, signed into law by President Hoover shortly after the United States—and the world—fell into the black hole of the Great Depression.
Several fundamental conditions are widely presumed necessary for a country to enjoy the benefits of global trade. One condition is that import activity ought not exceed export activity. Put more simply, we must sell more than we buy. On its face this seem reasonable. It seems logical that a trade deficit (that is, selling less than we buy) is a drain on our economy. Indeed, every month the news media feed us the bad news about the negative “balance of trade” data reported by the Commerce Department.
Prior to the origination of the plans for the Panama Canal vessels of trade had few options of getting goods from Europe and Asia to N. America. One was to sail around the southern tip of South America (Cape Horn) adding months to the journey if they were lucky enough to make it through what is known as one of the most hazardous shipping routes in the world, where it’s estimated that over 800 ships have been lost over the last couple of centuries of trade.
On February 10, 2025, President Trump signed proclamations to reinstate the full 25% tariff on steel imports and increase tariffs on aluminum imports to 25%. Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 affords the President with the authority to adjust imports being brought into the U.S. in quantities or under circumstances that threaten to impair national security. The President says the reinvigorated Section 232 tariffs “will support the program’s original objective of revitalizing the domestic steel and aluminum industries and achieving sustainable capacity utilization of at least 80%.”
The United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) joint review process is scheduled to begin on July 1, 2026, but the time to prepare is now. Embedded trade compliance professionals should already be doing scenario analysis—pulling data, calculating the supply chain impacts of potential changes, and helping their companies to strategize accordingly.
In 2024, China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) saw significant financial engagement. Preliminary data indicates that China invested approximately $92.4 billion in various projects across the 149 countries involved in the BRI. China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) encompasses numerous large-scale infrastructure projects across the globe.
As of now, the start of 2025, there are several Chinese industrial parks in Mexico, with notable examples including the Hofusan Industrial Park near Monterrey, which hosts manufacturing plants for ten Chinese companies. When one is considering how to navigate the U.S. import tariffs, for many Chinese manufacturers, pulling the trigger on nearshoring is the right move.
Recent announcements by former U.S. President Donald Trump regarding the potential imposition of import duties on goods from Mexico have created uncertainty for companies operating under the IMMEX program. Many businesses are concerned that the benefits provided by this program may no longer apply.
As one of his first official acts as President, Trump released his memorandum on America First Trade Policy. The policy offers insight into the new administration’s trade priorities and calls for a review of current trade-related policies. President Trump says his goal is to establish “a robust and reinvigorated trade policy that promotes investment and productivity, enhances our Nation’s industrial and technological advantages, defends our economic and national security, and — above all — benefits American workers, manufacturers, farmers, ranchers, entrepreneurs, and businesses.”
The Trump Administration has demonstrated a willingness to apply new tariffs to goods entering the U.S. as a viable tactic under its America First strategy to achieve greater fairness in its dealings with other countries. The application of tariffs is authorized under a number of standard legal procedures, such as trade remedy investigations to mitigate dumping of goods at less than fair value into the U.S. market or eliminating the unfair price advantages of government subsidies, and use of section 301 duties to respond to unfair trade practices by other countries. However, the broad-brush use of tariffs to coerce our trading partners to make concessions in non-trade areas to resolve a domestic crisis is relatively new.
I can’t help but reflect on a negotiation seminar I took in law school, where we studied the Madman Theory, popularized by Richard Nixon. The theory suggests that acting unpredictably or being willing to take extreme actions can create leverage. If your opponent believes you might “blow it all up,” they may feel forced to make concessions. This strategy clearly echoes Trump’s approach to trade policy.
President Donald Trump made headlines when he announced an External Revenue Service (ERS) agency to collect tariff incomes. The announcement sparked a heated debate among trade experts, economists, and business leaders. But, what exactly would be the purpose of the agency? Well, we can take the words spoken from his inauguration address as an answer.
China has significantly expanded its economic and geopolitical footprint in Latin America, particularly through the acquisition and development of critical infrastructure such as ports, airfields, and railways. This strategic move has raised questions about the long-term implications for regional sovereignty, global trade routes, and the future of the Panama Canal, a linchpin of international maritime commerce.
If you have a company that imports chemicals – whether they are used as raw materials or components for onward manufacturing, or finished goods containing chemical components – you have been facing significant challenges over the last half-dozen years. Some of these challenges include the trade wars with China (I’m looking at you, Section 301) and the disruptive impact of COVID-19 to global supply chains. In response to these challenges, you have maybe modified your supply chain to reduce your dependence on Chinese chemical imports. Or perhaps your supply chain was not largely affected by Section 301 tariffs (if so, consider yourself lucky – and may your luck hold!).
A customs broker license is issued to a person who has successfully passed a grueling licensing exam (after paying the exam fee), submitted a license application (along with another fee), and passed the subsequent FBI background investigation. The open-book exam, which lasts 4½ hours and comprises 80 multiple-choice questions, is ostensibly intended to measure one’s knowledge about various customs-related regulations and practices yet experience or employment in a customs-related job is not a prerequisite.