The resurgence of Section 301 tariff investigations marks a pivotal shift in U.S. trade policy. Following the Supreme Court’s invalidation of tariffs imposed under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) has turned to Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 as a more durable legal pathway to reimpose and potentially expand tariff measures.
The United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) is a trilateral free trade agreement that went into effect on July 1, 2020, as a replacement for its predecessor, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The three involved governments are preparing to initiate the first formal joint review in July 2026 as part of the sixth anniversary of the agreement entering into effect.
The legality of the Fentanyl IEEPA tariffs and the Reciprocal IEEPA tariffs is currently pending in the Supreme Court. A decision is expected in January, although it could come sooner, though the Court may not directly address refund mechanics. Instead, it could remand the issue to the Court of International Trade (CIT), which would delay guidance for several months.
In the Chinese zodiac calendar, 2025 is the year of the snake. The snake is said to represent wisdom and strategy. As it occasionally sheds its skin, it is also said to represent a change or an inflection point. Whether American trade policy in the year of the snake exemplifies wisdom and strategy depends on one’s political perspective. Whether it exemplifies a major transformation and inflection point is unquestionable.
Importers who have paid tariffs imposed under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) should take immediate steps to preserve their eligibility for potential refunds. Multiple lawsuits are currently challenging the legality of these tariffs, and the Supreme Court is set to decide the issue in November. If the Court ultimately invalidates the tariffs, importers may be entitled to recover duties paid. However, securing refunds depends on preserving jurisdictional options—especially given the uncertainty about whether these tariffs constitute a protestable decision under customs law. There are three potential refund mechanisms at play.
Question 1: How are you advising businesses in your jurisdiction when protecting themselves from the impact of trade wars and sanctions, and what strategies can professional services firms offer to mitigate these risks?
The United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) joint review process is scheduled to begin on July 1, 2026, but the time to prepare is now. Embedded trade compliance professionals should already be doing scenario analysis—pulling data, calculating the supply chain impacts of potential changes, and helping their companies to strategize accordingly.
In today’s complex global marketplace, businesses are increasingly confronted with the challenges of supply chain disruptions, rising costs, and fierce competition—all exacerbated by trade remedy tariffs. While many of these tariffs are already in play, President-elect Trump has promised to impose new tariffs and increase old ones.
This is the second of a three-part series about the USMCA joint review process, focusing on China, Mexico, and competing visions of a “worker-centered” trade policy. Part one introduces the USMCA joint review process and explores how US trade policy would likely operate during Trump’s second term. Part two outlines some of the major trade issues that will be on the table during joint review, focusing on the Mexico-US relationship, and anticipates Harris’s likely approach to trade policy.
This is the first of a three-part series about the USMCA joint review process, focusing on China, Mexico, and competing visions of a “worker-centered” trade policy. Part one introduces the USMCA joint review process and explores how US trade policy would likely operate during Trump’s second term. Part two outlines some of the major trade issues that will be on the table during joint review, focusing on the Mexico-US relationship, and anticipates Harris’s likely approach to trade policy. Part three offers a critique of the worker-centered trade policy developed under the Biden administration, presents an alternative, and suggests new avenues for multi-stakeholder participation that Harris’s approach might create.