Renewal of Haiti HOPE/HELP and AGOA Trade Preferences Up to Senate

Background

In its usual fashion, Congress has allowed the tariff preferences for Haiti under the United States-Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act (CBTPA)^[1] and the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA)^[2] to expire on September 30, 2025.  Two bills passed the House with bipartisan majorities on January 12, 2026, to renew the tariff preferences retroactively to the date of expiration and then extend them to September 30, 2028.^[3]  Both bills are now in the Senate Finance Committee awaiting action. This article examines the current status and likely outcomes of Senate review.

Purpose of the Programs

AGOA:  According to the House bill, “AGOA is the cornerstone of economic relations between the United States and sub-Saharan African nations.” … “ AGOA provides preferential duty treatment for certain products from sub-Saharan African nations that meet the program’s eligibility criteria. Prior to the program’s September 30, 2025 expiration, 32 African countries were eligible to receive duty-free treatment under AGOA.”  

Haiti:  The House text states, “the Haitian Hemispheric Opportunity through Partnership Encouragement (HOPE) Act and the Haiti Economic Lift Program (HELP)” … programs, collectively, are an important source of economic growth and stability within Haiti. By facilitating apparel sourcing for U.S. companies, these initiatives support thousands of textile jobs across both nations.”

Actions in Senate

In addition to the House bills, two Senate bills have been introduced, S.2958 that would extend AGOA benefits through 2027 and address the U.S. bilateral relationship with South Africa, and S.742 that would extend Haiti benefits through 2035.   Together, these indicate the likely passage of the extension bills in some form.  

No Senate Finance markup has been noticed or scheduled for either AGOA (H.R. 6500), or Haiti HOPE/HELP (H.R. 6504) and no committee action has been indicated in the near term.  The Senate has not placed either bill on the floor calendar as a clean stand-alone measure.  The most likely scenario is that the extension bills will be folded into a “must-pass” piece of legislation, most likely involving a final government funding package.

Terms of Extension

As of January 30, 2026, the Senate has not yet passed or transmitted to the House a finalized government funding bill that includes the extensions of the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) or the Haiti Economic Lift Program (HOPE/HELP). Senate negotiations remain focused on avoiding a lapse in appropriations, with unresolved disputes—particularly over Department of Homeland Security funding and immigration policy—delaying completion of a full-year spending package. While congressional leaders have publicly signaled that trade preference extensions are candidates for inclusion in a broader funding vehicle, key terms remain unsettled, including the length of any extension (whether a shorter bridge through 2026 or a longer extension through 2028), whether the Senate will adopt the House-passed retroactive duty-relief and reliquidation provisions without modification, and whether the measures will move as clean extensions or as part of a negotiated appropriations compromise. Accordingly, the question before Congress is no longer whether AGOA and Haiti trade preferences will be extended, but when and on what final terms.

Impacts on Users of Preferences

For existing users of AGOA and Haiti trade preferences, the delay in enactment has had immediate and practical consequences. Importers have been required to enter covered goods at full MFN duty rates following the September 30, 2025 lapse, increasing landed costs, complicating pricing and contracting decisions, and forcing some firms to post additional cash or bonds while reserving rights to seek refunds if the programs are restored. The uncertainty has also disrupted sourcing and production planning, particularly for apparel and other labor-intensive sectors that rely on stable rules of origin and predictable duty treatment. Passage of an extension would materially reverse these effects by restoring duty-free treatment and, if enacted as proposed by the House, permitting retroactive reliquidation of qualifying entries made during the lapse period, thereby returning duties paid and restoring balance-sheet certainty. Even so, the interruption itself underscores the structural risk posed by short-term extensions, as repeated lapses—however brief—undermine the long-term investment and supply-chain commitments that these preference programs are intended to support.

Impact of Reciprocal Tariffs

For customs compliance purposes, the enactment of AGOA and Haiti HOPE/HELP preferences would re-establish duty-free entry for qualifying goods notwithstanding the continued application of country-based “reciprocal” tariffs imposed under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA). As a matter of tariff stacking, preferential duty treatment under AGOA or CBERA §213A eliminates ordinary MFN duties but does not automatically displace additional duties imposed under independent statutory authorities, including Section 301, Section 232, or IEEPA-based measures, unless the underlying action expressly provides an exemption. Accordingly, even after passage of the preference extensions, importers must continue to evaluate whether reciprocal country tariffs apply and must structure entries, documentation, and post-entry review accordingly. Compliance teams should expect continued complexity in entry summaries, refund strategies, and duty-recovery planning until the interaction between preferences and IEEPA tariffs is definitively resolved.

If the Supreme Court were to invalidate the reciprocal country tariffs as unconstitutional or beyond the scope of IEEPA, qualifying AGOA and Haiti preference users would likely see a full restoration of duty-free treatment without stacked country-based surcharges, and importers could pursue refunds of improperly collected IEEPA duties through protests, reliquidations, or lawsuits and court-ordered remedies, depending on the scope and retroactivity of the decision. From a systems and controls perspective, such a ruling would substantially simplify tariff classification and duty calculation for covered goods, reduce the need for contingent reserves and disclosure strategies, and restore the core policy function of the preference programs as stand-alone development and sourcing tools rather than partial offsets to broader tariff regimes. Until such a ruling occurs, however, compliance professionals must assume that preference eligibility and reciprocal tariffs coexist, and should continue to preserve claims, maintain detailed entry records, and monitor litigation developments closely.

Conclusion

Given the urgency of passing some measure to fund the government during the first week of February, it is highly likely that the AGOA and Haiti HOPE/HELP bills will be delayed for the near term.  The politics of trade in 2026 are contentious, even if there is bipartisan support for the AGOA and Haiti trade preferences extension.  How that will be resolved is an important question for Congress.

^[1] 19 U.S.C. 2703 and 2703(a)

^[2] 19 U.S.C. 3721(g)

^[3] Haiti Economic Lift Program Extension Act — H.R. 6504 (HOPE/HELP via CBERA §213A); AGOA Extension Act — H.R. 6500