As is well known the US has imposed duties of 25% on imports from Canada and Mexico. This means that those imports will take the regular duty plus 25%. For example, a switchgear assembly classified under 8537.10.91 made in Canada or Mexico will take a duty of 2.7% plus the special tariff of 25% for a total rate of 27.7% of the value.
On March 3, 2025, the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) released the 2025 Trade Policy Agenda and 2024 Annual Report on the Trade Agreements Program. The report outlines the rationale of the Trump Administration for its trade policy goals and actions. It complements and expands on the America First Trade Policy Executive Order and also encompasses the massive imposition of tariffs by the President on April 2 in his so-called “Liberation Day” Executive Order and Fact Sheet.
Donald Trump’s first term in office pursued an aggressive foreign policy toward China, imposing tariffs, restricting technology transfers, and accusing Beijing of unfair trade practices. However, one unintended consequence of this hardline approach has been China’s accelerated expansion into Latin America—a region traditionally within the U.S. sphere of influence.
Liberation Day passed with the promised reciprocal tariffs touted by the Trump administration. The president, surrounded by workers in the Rose Garden on April 2, executed a number of tariffs promising to Make America Wealthy Again. How did they calculate these tariffs? Well, there’s speculation.
On March 7, 2025, the White House hosted a Digital Assets Summit to celebrate the creation of a Bitcoin Strategic Reserve and a Digital Assets Stockpile by an Executive Order titled, “Establishment of the Strategic Bitcoin Reserve and United States Digital Asset Stockpile“. The Executive Order recognizes that “The Bitcoin protocol permanently caps the total supply of bitcoin (BTC) at 21 million coins, which is critical to its value proposition as a scarce asset.
The various tariffs that President Trump has imposed since retaking office are based on delegated authority found in several existing statutes. But a century ago, tariffs were primarily the purview of Congress. One of the most controversial manifestations of U.S. tariff legislation (and of American legislation in general) was the Smoot–Hawley Tariff Act of 1930, signed into law by President Hoover shortly after the United States—and the world—fell into the black hole of the Great Depression.
Several fundamental conditions are widely presumed necessary for a country to enjoy the benefits of global trade. One condition is that import activity ought not exceed export activity. Put more simply, we must sell more than we buy. On its face this seem reasonable. It seems logical that a trade deficit (that is, selling less than we buy) is a drain on our economy. Indeed, every month the news media feed us the bad news about the negative “balance of trade” data reported by the Commerce Department.
Prior to the origination of the plans for the Panama Canal vessels of trade had few options of getting goods from Europe and Asia to N. America. One was to sail around the southern tip of South America (Cape Horn) adding months to the journey if they were lucky enough to make it through what is known as one of the most hazardous shipping routes in the world, where it’s estimated that over 800 ships have been lost over the last couple of centuries of trade.
On February 10, 2025, President Trump signed proclamations to reinstate the full 25% tariff on steel imports and increase tariffs on aluminum imports to 25%. Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 affords the President with the authority to adjust imports being brought into the U.S. in quantities or under circumstances that threaten to impair national security. The President says the reinvigorated Section 232 tariffs “will support the program’s original objective of revitalizing the domestic steel and aluminum industries and achieving sustainable capacity utilization of at least 80%.”
The United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) joint review process is scheduled to begin on July 1, 2026, but the time to prepare is now. Embedded trade compliance professionals should already be doing scenario analysis—pulling data, calculating the supply chain impacts of potential changes, and helping their companies to strategize accordingly.
The intricate interplay between trade and food security has emerged as a vital global issue, one that is closely interwoven with the tapestry of international conflicts and political instability. Remember the 2019 pandemic when toilet paper supply chains were interrupted? Now imagine that on a much larger scale with basic food staples like rice, wheat or corn.
In the ever-changing world of trade, where predicting the future is a constant challenge, looking back at the past decade offers valuable insights into the evolution of the supply chain and the tools that have developed to contribute to efficiency and security.
On January 16, 2024, the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) under Assistant Secretary for Export Enforcement, Matthew Axelrod, disclosed significant enhancements to the process for Voluntary Self-Disclosures (VSDs) related to the Export Administration Regulations (EAR). These adjustments are strategically designed to streamline export control compliance for U.S. governmental bodies, the commercial sector, and academic entities.
Uno de los requisitos más importantes para importar mercancías a México es estar registrado como importador en el registro de importadores mexicanos. Hay 2 tipos de registros para importadores, uno es para importadores generales (Padrón de Importadores) y el otro es para importadores de sectores industriales específicos (Padrón de Importadores de Sectores Específicos) que pueden importar mercancías identificadas por el código arancelario MX (es decir, productos químicos, armas de fuego, puros, calzado, textiles, alcohol, hidrocarburos, siderurgia, automoción, etc.). Generalmente, estos 2 registros son listados con información de personas y entidades autorizadas para importar mercancías a México.
By: Gavin Andersen, Law Clerk, LCB and Adrienne Braumiller, Founding Partner, Braumiller Law Group Last June (2023), in response to a ruling request from Your Special
At the core of the definition, a Parallel import is a non-counterfeit product imported from another country without the permission of the intellectual property owner. They are also goods that are not authorized for importation into the U.S. It’s a global phenomenon, a very grey area, and their presence varies across different parts of the globe.
One of the most important requirements for importing goods into Mexico is to be registered as an importer under the Mexican importer’s registry. There are 2 types of registries for importers, one is for general importers (Padron de Importadores), and the other is for importers of specific industry sectors (Padron the Importadores de Sectores Especificos) which may import goods identified by the MX tariff code (i.e. chemical products, firearms, cigars, footwear, textiles, alcohol, hydrocarbons, steel, automotive, etc.). Generally, these 2 registries are lists with information of individuals and entities authorized to bring goods into Mexico.
Consider this scenario: a client faced the challenge of deferring duty payments while managing a significant volume of imports destined for re-exportation from the U.S. Initially considering duty drawbacks, which proved unsuitable for their specific needs, we turned our attention to bonded warehouses and free trade zones. This scenario is not uncommon in the trade world and highlights a critical decision point for many businesses: choosing between a bonded warehouse and a Foreign Trade Zone (FTZ).
The First Sale Rule applies in circumstances such as the example above. A US company places an order with a middleman in the US. The middleman in turn subcontracts to a foreign supplier. The supplier then ships the product either to the middleman or to the original US company that placed the order, meaning either could be the importer of record. The entered value could be the amount on the original purchase order or the price paid by the middleman to the foreign supplier.
The world of cryptocurrencies on blockchains and the world of traditional assets in markets have often stood in stark contrast to one another since Bitcoin’s creation in 2008. The lack of a reliable bridge between these two worlds has limited the impact of cryptocurrencies on assets in the real-world outside of on-chain speculation and prevented adoption of the benefits that blockchain technologies can bring to real world processes.